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ORGANIZED VERSUS SPONTANEOUS SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA 
A contribution Co the discussion from an economie point of view 
Tom Kuhlman 
In the quest for what are called durable solutions to Africa's refugee 
problems, most attention is focused on refugee integration in the 
country of first asylum. As is well known, three such solutions are 
recognized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR): voluntary repatriation, integration in the country of first 
asylum, and resettlement in a third country. The first is the preferred 
option, and millions of African refugees have repatriated voluntarily 
during the past two decades (Rogge & Akol, 1989). However, this is an 
option which depends entirely on improvement of the situation in the 
refugees' country of origin; it is thus largely outside the perspective 
of those observers and policymakers who are concerned with assisting 
refugees in the country of asylum. Attempts to stimulate it in the 
absence of such improvement are unlikely to meet with success - worse, 
they risk violating the principle of non-refoulement (Harrell-Bond, 
1989). 
Third-country resettlement is considered the least desirable option: 
it is expensive, and the social problems of integration are, if 
anything, even more intractable than in the country of first asylum 
(where the cultural setting is often at least somewhat familiar to the 
refugees). In the current international climate it is an option 
available only to a fortunate minority of better-educated refugees.1 
Moreover, by depriving the refugee community of precisely those 
elements that may constitute indigenous leadership and by fostering the 
hope of moving to a better place, the limited availability of this 
option may frustrate rather than enhance the success of local 
integration. Given the impotence of the international community in 
promoting the first alternative and its unwillingness as regards the 
third, integration in the country of first asylum becomes - if only by 
default - the most feasible option in all cases where a solution for 
the 'root cause' of flight is not immediately in sight. 
Two questions may then be asked: what constitutes such integration, 
and how is it to be achieved or, more modestly, promoted? As for the 
latter question, there are basically two alternative policies: either 
the refugees are allowed to settle freely among the local populace, or 
special settlement schemes are devised for them by the host country 
government in cooperation with UNHCR (a combination of the two is, of 
course, also possible). These alternatives are usually referred to as 
spontaneous and organized settlement, respectively. The term 
'spontaneous' is somewhat inadequate: there is little spontaneity in 
refugee movements which tend to be governed by necessity rather than 
f ree choice. Instead, I shall often use the terms 'self-settled 
refugees' and 'settlements', meaning organized settlements. 
This article proposes a definition of integration, formulated with 
a view to its convenience for policies and programmes concerned with 
refugees. The focus is on economie integration, which is a crucial 
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aspect both for the refugees themselves and for the agencies spending 
funds on them. Next, the debate on the issue of organized vs. 
spontaneous settlement for refugees in Africa that has taken place in 
the past is reviewed, as well as the policies that have been its 
outcome. Armed with the concept of economie integration, an attempt is 
made to evaluate the relative merits of organized and spontaneous 
settlement on the basis of empirical evidence. Most of this evidence 
comes from the case of Eritrean refugees in the Eastern Sudan, among 
whom the author conducted research (Kok, 1989; Kuhlman, 1990); however, 
I have drawn also from literature on refugee integration elsewhere in 
Africa. 
It must be stated at the outset that in assessing the influence of 
the type of settlement policy on economie integration, this article 
deals with only one aspect - albeit a crucial one - of those policies. 
It attempts to determine which type is the more conducive to economie 
integration. There are many reasons for adopting one policy or the 
other; while I shall comment on these reasons, it is not my purpose to 
prove wrong those policies that are actually foliowed by host country 
governments and by international agencies. My only concern is that 
those policies which are detrimental to economie integration are shown 
to be so, and that any argument in favour of such policies must be 
based on different grounds. Another point is that the article is 
concerned only with what have been termed the rehabilitation and the 
development phases of refugee assistance, not with the phase of 
emergency relief. Settlements are quite different from relief camps, 
and arguments concerning the one are not valid for the other. 
What is economie integration? 
Whereas integration is often hailed as the goal of refugee assistance, 
there has been little effort to define it with the precision necessary 
to ascertain whether it is being achieved. Of course, integration can 
be seen as a process rather than a goal, but even then it is necessary 
to state the direction in which that process is supposed to proceed. 
Thus, an UNHCR publication describes integration as "the process by 
which the refugee is assimilated into the social and economie life of 
a new national community" (UNHCR, undated: 5) . This definition is 
clearly unsatisfactory: it is tautological in merely replacing the term 
to be defined by another word. 
A useful definition should reflect the purpose of a policy. The 
purpose of refugee assistance can be summarized as making itself 
superfluous - achieving a situation where assistance can be withdrawn. 
Thus, integration might be defined as a state of affairs where the 
refugees have become independent of external assistance. However, for 
that case I prefer the term self-sufficiency. Refugees are self-
sufficient when they manage to acquire an income (in cash or kind) such 
that they do not need to be given relief in the form of bas ie 
necessities such as food, clothing or shelter. To be exact, this is 
called familv self-sufficiencv. At that stage, aid for services such 
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as education, health and water supplies may still be necessary. A 
situation where the refugees are also able to finance community 
services themselves (whether communally or through taxation) is called 
community self-sufficiency.2 
Self-sufficiency of either type can be a useful objective for 
organized settlements. The concept has no meaning, however, in the 
context of self-settled refugees who survive without aid anyway and are 
therefore self-sufficiënt by definition. As they often live in abject 
poverty, however, it would be quite improper to call them integrated. 
Therefore, integration should reflect a situation where the problems 
resulting from flight are solved.3 Integration subsumes the concept of 
self-sufficiency without being identical with it. 
These problems concern not only the refugees themselves, but also 
the population of the host country which bears the burden of their 
presence. Therefore, a definition of integration should include the 
effects of that burden. This element is reflected in Harrei1-Bond' s 
tentative definition: "a situation in which host and refugee 
communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources - both 
economie and social - with no greater mutual conflict than that which 
exists within the host community" (1986: 7). However, she immediately 
rejects this definition as too simple: access to resources may be 
unequal, one group may be exploited by another, and conflict within the 
host society may have increased due to the pressure of the refugees' 
presence (Ibid.). Yet her definition has at least the merit that it 
looks at integration as something that happens not only to refugees but 
also to the host society. 
Bulcha (1988: 85) uses a definition formulated by W.S. Bernard in 
connection with migrants in general: "integration is achieved when 
migrants become a working part of their adopted society, take on many 
of its attitudes and behaviour patterns and participate freely in its 
activities, but at the same time retain a measure of their original 
cultural identity and ethnicity". Bulcha thinks that this definition 
describes reality in Africa better than concepts such as assimilation 
or absorption do, in view of the plural nature of most African 
societies. Assimilation means that the migrants give up their former 
group identity and adopt the culture of the host society, but in a 
multi-cultural society migrants are likely to maintain their identity 
just like everyone else does. In Bulcha's words, integration "implies 
a mutual 'live and let live' attitude based on tolerance of 
differences, solidarity and positive interaction. This is not to 
suggest a harmonious equilibrium or a static balance between the 
different groups. Conflict is naturally part of the relationship" 
(Ibid.: 86). This may well describe loosely what happens to refugees 
in Africa, but how are we to measure integration in this sense, to 
what can it be opposed? Bulcha opposes 'integration' to 
'marginalization' , the latter meaning "withdrawal of the minority group 
into certain occupations, separate areas of residence or an inferior 
status"; it also involves "a limited degree of tolerance and acceptance 
. . . towards the minority . . . [which] must learn to survive under 
extreme social stress." (Ibid.) However, the concept of marginality -
as is clear from Bulcha's own account - is the opposite not of 
integration but of assimilation: he quotes sociologists such as Park, 
Stonequist and Merton who all refer to 'marginal man' as an individual 
who fails to become a member of the community into which he has 
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migrated.4 Bulcha's own formulation of the concept of integration is 
vague and contradictory: there may be solidarity and positive 
interaction, but also disequilibrium and conflict. When is a refugee 
integrated and when marginalized? Bulcha seems to suggest that the 
former applies to refugees in Africa and the latter to migrants from 
Third-World countries in Europe (1988: 86), but this is too facile: in 
Europe migrants can be marginalized because they could also be 
assimilated, whereas in plural societies there is nothing they could 
assimilate to - there is no common culture, nor any common Standard of 
behaviour or wellbeing to which they could adhere or from which they 
could be said to deviate. Surely, many refugees in Africa also 
'withdraw into certain occupations', suffer from 'an inferior status' 
as well as from 'extreme social stress'. 
Because of this vagueness, Bulcha's definition is incapable of being 
operationalized; nor does it include the element of the refugees' 
impact on the host society - a reflection of the fact that refugee 
studies and refugee policies tend to be concerned with refugees only 
(cf. Chambers, 1986). On the other hand, the distinction between 
assimilation and integration is a useful one, especially in an African 
context. Obviously, a practical definition of integration in a plural 
society5 must recognize the existence of a social stratification 
correlated with ethnicity. This means, for instance, that income 
differences between refugees and nationals do not automatically 
indicate a lack of integration: they may reflect existing differences 
between ethnic groups within the host society. Similarly, social 
distance or antagonism between refugees and nationals may not be higher 
than between different groups of nationals. 
Instead I propose the following criteria: if refugees are able to 
participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with their skills 
and compatible with their cultural values; if they attain a Standard 
of living which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements;6 
if the socio-cultural change they undergo permits them to maintain an 
identity of their own and to adjust psychologically to their new 
situation; if standards of living and economie opportunities for 
members of the host society have not deteriorated due to the influx of 
refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse 
than among the host population itself; and if the refugees do not 
encounter more discrimination than exists between groups previously 
settled within the host society: then refugees are truly integrated. 
A durable solution to the problems arising from flight can be said to 
have been achieved. This may seem a paradisiacal status seldom if ever 
attained in practice. What matters, however, is that it should give us 
a yardstick for measuring progress and for comparing the effects of 
alternative policies. 
Integration itself is then defined as the process of change caused 
by the settlement of migrants in a plural society, if that process is 
evaluated in terms of the above criteria. It is obviously a process 
with many dimensions, each of which is the proper field of a particular 
science. We shall be concerned here with one dimension only: the 
economie, loosely defined as those aspects of social life having to do 
with attaining material welfare through the optimal allocation of 
resources that are scarce and alternatively applicable.7 Stated more 
simply, we are concerned with how incomes are acquired, how high they 
are, and what Standard of living they provide. Standard of living is 
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taken here as meaning not only income (in cash or kind) from economie 
activities, but also access to amenities such as housing, public 
Utilities, health services, and education. 
The question with which this article is concerned can now be 
restated as follows: what are the differences between organized and 
spontaneous settlement in terms of (1) the participation of refugees 
in economie activities (both proportionally and in relation to their 
skills); (2) the incomes acquired; (3) their access to amenities; (4) 
the effects on the host population in terms of employment, incomes and 
access to amenities? In other words: which of the two settlement forms 
stands the best chance of providing the refugees with satisfactory 
employment and a minimally acceptable Standard of living, and which has 
the lowest negative effects on the host population? 
In attempting to answer these questions, attention has to be paid 
to three issues: (1) the position of different socio-economie groups 
within both refugees and host population, rather than considering only 
the aggregate; (2) the distinction between short-term and long-term 
effects; and (3) the conditions that govern the effects of each 
settlement form: some effects depend not on the settlement form as 
such, but on changeable conditions in a particular case. 
Organized vs. spontaneous settlement: the debate 
Whenever African governments have recognized the existence of a refugee 
problem they have favoured organized settlement,8 and in this they have 
mostly been supported by UNHCR. There are several sound reasons for 
such a policy,9 especially when seen from the institutional interests 
of the state. In the first place, refugees always pose a security 
hazard to the state which gives them asylum, as i'ts territory could be 
used as a staging-post for subversive action against the refugees' 
country of origin by militant elements among the refugees.10 In order 
to avoid such a predicament the OAU Convention of 1969 prescribes that 
refugees are settled at a reasonable distance from the border (Nobel, 
1982: 15). Putting the refugees into settlements is the easiest way to 
achieve this and to keep them under control. 
A second rcason for preferring organized settlement is that it is 
much easier to obtain foreign aid when the refugees are concentrated 
in a few locations where they are clearly visible than when they are 
dispersed among the local population. Spontaneously settled refugees 
are difficult to identify; their needs are not easily assessed; and 
the extent of the burden they impose on the host country is open to 
question. Refugees in camps, by contrast, pose a demonstrable and 
quantifiable burden, and therewith present a clear case for aid before 
the inte m a t i ona 1 c ommun i ty. 
Aid organizations also have good reasons to support organized 
settlement. Their aim is to provide aid, and in order to get the 
necessary funds they must be able to show the need for them to their 
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constituents. As is the case for the host country, settlements make 
it easy to demonstrate and quantify this need. With self-settled 
refugees it would be very difficult to distinguish between aid provided 
for them and aid provided to the local population. These two are target 
groups for different aid organizations, and confusing them would raise 
all sorts of thorny issues regarding the competence of agencies and 
earmarking of funds. 
Given the institutional context in which governments and aid 
organizations operate (see on this, for instance, Kent, 1987), these 
motivations are valid and realistic. They do not necessarily look good 
to public opinion, however, and therefore they are often justified by 
invoking other arguments. The most important of these are: 
(1) Settlements would provide better economie conditions for refugees. 
(2)By settling refugees separately from the local population, 
preferably in undeveloped areas and with external financing, the 
burden on th« host country's economy would be minimized. 
These arguments, it will be recognized, deal with the question of 
economie integration as defined above, and it is with these that I 
shall take issue in this article. Other, more doubtful, arguments are 
sometimes advanced: 
(3) The re can be many reasons why governments wish to keep refugees 
separate from nationals (Holborn, 1975, Vol. I: 306-307): sometimes 
the refugees reinforce the numbers of a particular group in the host 
country, upsetting a precarious balance (cf. Karadawi, 1983: 540). 
(4)In some host countries there is fear that a large number of self-
settled refugees could lead to an increased crime rate. Such fears 
are rarely expressed in international fora, but they are frequently 
stated privately (and in domestic political debate publicly as 
well) . Regardless of its validity, this motivation must be 
recognized in examining the preference for organized settlement. 
(5)Settlements would permit the refugees to live in their own 
communities under their own leaders. 
Rogge (1981: 200) mentions some further points: 
(6)aid can be more concentrated and thus cheaper in settlements; 
(7)by keeping refugees together, their eventual repatriation is 
facilitated; and 
(8)governments want to keep refugees out of cities, where they would 
add to urban problems. 
None of these arguments can, I think, be considered valid. While 
concern about changing proportions of ethnic groups is perhaps 
understandable, it hardly deserves support. The fear of alien criminals 
is inspired by xenophobia rather than by evidence; if there is higher 
delinquency among refugees, it is likely to be due to restrictions 
imposed on their legal economie activities. As regards the supposed 
autonomy of settlements, they are highly artificial communities. Set 
up not by the refugees but by others, more of ten than not joining 
people from diverse social and cultural backgrounds whose original 
leadership structure may have collapsed, and controlled by a 
bureaucracy of camp authorities, refugees in settlements do not 
necessarily have more autonomy than the self-settled (cf. Harrell-Bond, 
1986: 87-104). As for the arguments quoted by Rogge, setting up and 
maintaining settlements is more expensive than assisting self-settled 
refugees to achieve the same Standard of living as enjoyed by those in 
the settlements, as will be demonstrated below. When mentioning the 
6 
argument on repatriation he must have had have forced repatriation in 
mind; if the conditions are favourable to voluntary repatriation, 
refugees will return home without having to be herded into lorries. The 
final argument depends on whether one is talking about keeping rural 
people out of the cities by force (a policy which is doomed to fail) 
or about rural development in order to make the rural areas more 
attractive. In the latter case, the argument is the same as (1): 
whether economie integration is more easily achieved in spontaneous or 
in organized settlement. That argument is, of course, the one with 
which this article is primarily concerned. 
Whatever the arguments in its favour, the policy of organized 
settlement has not been a success: most refugees in Africa are 
spontaneously settled. In the early 1970s, less than 20 per cent were 
in organized settlements (Gould, 1974: 423). A recent source gives the 
proportion as 25 per cent (Cuénod, 1989: 8). There are two possible 
reasons: either governments and UNHCR are unable to accommodate the 
refugees, or the latter are unwilling to be accommodated in the 
settlements earmarked for them. As a matter of fact, both reasons 
apply. UNHCR's budget is already strained by the burden of supporting 
Africa's refugees, and settling four times as many would be quite 
beyond its present resources. As for host country governments, the 
potential for settling more refugees depends on what type of settlement 
one opts for. These types are discussed later in this article. However, 
resource limitations are not the sole reason for the failure of 
settlement policies. Many host governments (including the Sudan) 
attempt to draw more refugees into the settlements, but most refugees 
are apparently reluctant. They seem to prefer the hard struggle for 
survival as underprivileged aliens among the local population to the 
settlements where supposedly their subsistence is guaranteed, where 
social services such as education, health and water are provided for 
them, and where they are expertly assisted in becoming self-sufficiënt. 
A curieus phenomenon indeed. 
Naturally, this has given rise to considerable debate on the issue. 
A problem was that very little was known about the spontaneously 
settled refugees. One of the pioneers in this respect was the 
anthropologist Art Hansen, who studied Angolan refugees in Zambia from 
1966 onwards both the spontaneously settled and those in government 
settlements. He concluded that refugees were reluctant to live in 
government settlements because they wanted to maintain control over 
their own lives, which was worth more to them than the higher living 
Standard prevailing in the settlement (Hansen, 1981: 31). Furthermore, 
they feared forcible repatriation. Thus, one of the reasons why 
governments would favour organized settlement is the very reason why 
refugees might dislike it: Hansen's Angolans were eager to repatriate, 
but only when they thought conditions had improved sufficiently, not 
when the Zambian government would deern it convenient. 
At the seminar on Rural Refugees in Africa held at Arusha in 1976, 
it was concluded that "non-organized settlements have a better chance 
of developing self-reliance and self-management while avoiding the 
dependence mentality which has often been found in organized 
settlements" (Kibreab, 1985: 100, quoted by Wijbrandi, 1986: 10). 
However, the recommendations of the Arusha seminar did not result in 
a change of policy. Several students of refugee issues, notably 
Tristram Betts and Robert Chambers criticized Hansen's views on 
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spontaneous settlement: the burden of refugees on the host country 
needed more attention (Betts, 1981; Chambers, 1986); self-settled 
refugees were often extremely poor and economically insecure; and 
organized settlements were improving their performance (quoted in 
Wijbrandi, 1986: 10-11). Wijbrandi concludes his review of the 
discussion with the statement that "there is a growing consensus among 
scholars, governments and international and voluntary organizations 
that organized settlement of refugees should be given preference to 
self-settlement" (Ibid.: 12). However, Wijbrandi goes on to say, this 
conclusion is not definitive as there is a need for further research 
on spontaneous settlement. He and his colleagues carried out such 
research, and further fieldwork was done by the team of which the 
present author was a member. This allows us to take a closer look at 
the issues of the burden on the host, and the economie situation of the 
refugees. Based partly on Wijbrandi's work and partly on other studies 
now available, some further statements on the potential of organized 
settlements can also be made. 
Economie conditions for refugees: some empirical evidence 
Wijbrandi's team made two comparisons between a location with self-
settled refugees and an organized refugee settlement in the Gedaref 
region of Eastern Sudan. In both cases the locations were chosen in 
such a way that the principal differences between self-settled refugees 
and those in settlements could be ascribed to the settlement type -
other relevant conditions being similar. The first study (1983) was 
concerned with the little town of Doka and the nearby settlement of Urn 
Rakoba; this is a so-called land settlement, where plots of land are 
issued by the Sudanese government to refugees. On the whole, living 
conditions of refugees appeared to be better in the settlement: 67 per 
cent of households attained an income considered sufficiënt for basic 
needs, compared to 52 per cent among the self-settled; moreover, those 
in the settlement were better housed and did not have to pay rent, and 
they also had wider access to education and health facilities. From a 
social and a legal point of view, the situation of the refugees in the 
settlement was considered preferable. In both locations, however, the 
economie position of refugees was much below that of the Sudanese 
population, due to their limited access to means of production and due 
to the various restrictions imposed on them (Wijbrandi, 1984).u The 
second part of the field research, undertaken six months later, 
compared refugees and Sudanese in the town of Wad el-Hilew and in the 
settlement of Abuda. In this case, conditions among self-settled 
refugees were notably better: in Wad el-Hilew 61 per cent of the 
refugees had an income above Wijbrandi's poverty line, compared to only 
13 per cent in Abuda. As in the previous case, housing and health 
services were better in the settlement, but the percentage of 
schoolgoing refugee children was higher among the self-settled 
(Wijbrandi, 1985). 
From these findings, Wijbrandi concludes that the settlement type 
itself is not a decisive factor in economie integration: in the one 
8 
case the refugees in the settlement were better off, in the other it 
was the self-settled (1986: 123). This conclusion, however, may be 
challenged: in the first place, the differences in the latter case are 
far larger than in the former: taken together, the two samples indicate 
that 57 per cent of self-settled households attain an income above the 
minimum compared to 40 per cent in the settlements. The economie 
situation had worsened during the time elapsed between the two studies; 
this would have increased the number below the minimum, but one would 
have expected that this effect would be most pronounced among the self-
settled who did not have the access to relief food enjoyed by those in 
settlements. Secondly, and more importantly, even if the proportion 
below the poverty line in settlements would be equal to that among the 
self-settled, this would only mean that the vast amounts of aid 
provided both on relief and on making the refugees self-sufficiënt have 
resulted in a living Standard not notably higher - and quite possibly 
lower - than that of refugees who remained entirely outside the aid 
network and who had to cope with enormous odds. 
Therefore, I think Wijbrandi's research supports quite a different 
conclusion: that the settlement policy has utterly failed to enhance 
the economie integration of refugees. Apart from Wijbrandi's study 
there is scant other evidence comparing economie conditions in the two 
settlement forms. Bulcha (1988), who did research in three settlements 
and three locations among self-settled refugees, compares the length 
of employment during the year 1982. The figures are as follows: 
Table 1. Length of employment by type of settlement (%) 
Settlement type 
Months Organi zed Spontaneous 
0-3 
4-8 
9-12 
25 
33 
42 
14 
17 
69 
Total % 100 
280 
100 
133 
Source: Based on Bulcha, 1988: 157. 
From this table, it would appear that the self-settled have a more 
secure livelihood than the refugees living in settlements. Table 2 
presents a different picture regarding incomes: in urban areas the 
self-settled are better off, but in the rural areas the reverse seems 
to be the case, with 92 per cent far below the minimum necessary for 
subsistence (given by Bulcha as £S625 per year for rural areas and 
£S825 for urban areas). It is difficult to understand how those 92 per 
cent can survive, taking into account that they do not receive any aid. 
However, the representativity and statistical significance of these 
figures may be doubted, in view of the very small number of interviews. 
Where the average of rural and urban refugees is taken, the picture is 
again favourable to the self-settled (Bulcha, 1988: 167). 
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Table 2. Income distribution by type of settlement 
Settlement type 
Income (£S) Org. rural Spont. rural Org. urban Spont. urban 
0 26 24 19 18 
1-229 13 68 10 3 
300-599 30 6 25 7 
600-899 16 0 32 13 
900-1199 7 2 3 12 
1200-1499 4 0 7 25 
>1500 4 0 4 22 
Total % 100 100 100 100 
N 134 54 93 60 
Source: Calculated from Bulcha, 1988: 162 
The oldest settlement scheme in the Eastern Sudan, Qalaa en-Nahal, 
may have achieved self-sufficiency at family level, after many years 
of failures. However, the costly water supply and tractor schemes may 
have to be subsidized indefinitely (Rogge, 1985: 106-107) - in other 
words, community self-sufficiency was not remotely in sight in 1985, 
after sixteen years of operation. 
Why would it be so difficult to achieve a higher level of self-
sufficiency in settlements? One important reason has been that 
insufficiënt land was made available to refugees in the settlements. 
The official allotment is 10 feddan (a feddan is about one acre) per 
family, but Wijbrandi reports that in Um Rakoba and Abuda refugees in 
practice received only 5 feddan; according to data he received from the 
authorities, 39 per cent of all households in Um Rakoba were issued 
such allotments; in his sample, however, only 9 per cent of households 
had actually been given land (1984: 93). In Abuda the situation was 
better: 77 per cent had been provided with a plot (1985: 58). In Qalaa 
en-Nahal, the survey mentioned above found that 90 per cent of the 
refugees had received no land at all, and of the remainder 15 per cent 
had received less than the stipulated acreage (Betts, 1982: 92). Cree 
(1983: 3) reports that land allocation was a problem also at the 
settlement of Um Ali. Abuda is regarded by Jönsson & Cree (1982: 22-
23) as having relatively favourable prospects of attaining at least 
self-sufficiency in staple food. However, this is on the basis of 10 
feddan per family, which - as Wijbrandi says - "stands in shrill 
contrast to the actual situation in Abuda" (1985: 58). 
It is not that the Sudanese government is unwilling to grant land 
to the settlers; rather, it found it more difficult to do so than it 
had anticipated (this difficulty will be discussed in the next section, 
when I come to speak about the burden of refugees). Instead, since the 
late 1970s the government has opted for two alternative settlement 
forms in addition to the land settlement: the wage-earning rural 
settlement and the peri-urban settlement. The Sudan has large areas of 
commercial farming, where the supply of labour is a principal 
bottleneck. Most of the labourers in commercial farming are peasants, 
who subsist for part of the year on their own meagre farms and for 
another part on casual work on the large estates. It was thought that 
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by locating refugee settlements within the areas of large-scale 
agriculture, the refugees would not need to be given land, but could 
earn a living as agricultural labourers, therewith making a positive 
contribution to the Sudanese economy.12 The peri-urban settlement was 
intended to accommodate those refugees now self-settled in towns: a 
settlement near the town would be created for them with external 
financing, which would permit them to continue their income-generating 
activities while removing the pressure they exert on the urban 
infrastructure. 
A consultant for UNHCR carried out a study on the economie viability 
of five wage-earning settlements (four rural and one urban). Judging 
an annual income of about £S500 to be the minimum for satisfying basie 
needs, he estimated actual income per household in the four rural 
settlements at slightly below £S300, and potential income (assuming 
eight months of available employment and optimal refugee participation) 
at less than £S400 per year. In other words, the outlook for economie 
self-sufficiency even at household level was bleak, and income levels 
were actually worse than in the land settlements. Among Sudanese 
villagers in the same area, only 1-14 per cent of households had 
incomes below £S500 (quoting a UNHCR/ILO survey). The report concluded 
that three out of the four rural settlements were not actually or 
potentially viable, while the fourth was marginally viable (Purcell, 
1983: 55-61). The main difficulty with these settlements is the 
seasonal nature of agricultural employment, which does not permit the 
labourers to earn wages throughout the year - and unlike the Sudanese 
'semi-proletarians' , they do not have plots of their own with which to 
supplement their wages. 
The viability of peri- or semi-urban settlements appears to be 
somewhat better. For the Ethiopian refugees in the Sudan, only two have 
been created: one at Khashm el-Girba, the other, called Tawawa, just 
outside the large town of Gedaref. In both of them, refugees are better 
off than in the rural settlements of either type (ILO/UNHCR, 1984: 83). 
Khashm el-Girba is regarded by Purcell as having an acceptable economie 
base (1983: 61). Tawawa, however, is shows lower incomes than among the 
urban self-settled (Table 2). This is confirmed by Post (1985: 73, 
118). The greater distance to the sites of work is undoubtedly a major 
reason: most inhabitants of Tawawa depend on economie activities within 
the settlement itself, which is poor (Ibid.: 81). External assistance 
for income-generating activities has been given, but it has failed to 
provide the refugees in settlements with an income equal to that of the 
self-settled. As the ILO/UNHCR documents points out: 
"The activities supported by voluntary agencies are heavily 
supported financially and administratively. Most of the projects 
could be considered as social welfare schemes rather than 
socially and economically viable activities, and it is doubtful 
that these activities would survive the withdrawal of the 
support" (1984: 141). 
I think a fairly good case can be made that, in spite of massive 
aid to settlements for Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the Eastern 
Sudan, the refugees settled there are no better off - and frequently 
worse off - than the self-settled who survive largely without aid. 
Harrell-Bond (1986) provides circumstantial evidence suggesting the 
same conclusion for Ugandan refugees in the Southern Sudan (cf., for 
instance, pp. 351-355). 
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These cases are not sufficiënt, of course, to prove that 
settlements cannot be beneficial to refugees. Other countries may have 
had more successful experiences with them, Tanzania has been regarded 
as a country where organized settlement has been quite successful 
(Daley, 1984; Gasarasi, 1987). Unfortunately, there has been no 
systematic comparison with the conditions of the self-settled. Even in 
Tanzania, many refugees prefer to be self-settled and attempts have 
been made to move them to the settlements forcibly (Daley, 1984: 111). 
Armstrong (1987: 89) voices the impression that self-settled refugees 
are worse off than those in settlements, but not worse than the local 
population. He also remarks that there "seems to be a recurring trend" 
of refugees leaving older settlements where aid has been withdrawn 
(Ibid.: 100). Apparently, lasting community self-sufficiency was not 
achieved. In Zambia's Meheba settlement for Angolan refugees, material 
living conditions for refugees were regarded by Hansen as better than 
among the self-settled, yet very few refugees went there voluntarily 
(Hansen, 1982: 30). 
Whereas the record of settlements is not encouraging as far as 
income-generating activities are concerned, it cannot be denied that 
in most cases social services such as health and education are better 
than among the self-settled. The same is often true for housing, and 
sometimes for water. Of course, the same result could have been 
achieved if the aid spent on them had been used to assist self-settled 
refugees. On the whole, the aid spent on refugees in settlements cannot 
be shown to have had a positive impact on their economie wellbeing. 
There are, however, two points that must be raised against this 
conclusion. Primo, it is likely that the so-called vulnerable groups 
- handicapped and elderly people, single-parent households, orphans 
(cf. Pankhurst, 1984) - tend to be more heavily represented in 
settlements; such groups have greater difficulty in earning a living, 
which reduces the potential of the settlements for becoming self-
sufficient. Indeed, it may be part of some refugees' survival strategy 
to let some relatives who are less capable of fending for themselves 
live in a settlement where they can depend on aid. In this way, the 
existence of settlements contributes to the economie integration of the 
self-settled. Secundo. while organized settlement might not be the best 
solution for refugees, it may still be preferable in that it minimizes 
the burden imposed by the refugee influx on the host country. The 
latter point is taken up in the next section; the former I shall 
discuss presently. 
All ordered societies have mechanisms for providing for those who 
are unable to fend for themselves. Some are better at this than others, 
depending on the level of economie development, the prevailing 
ideology, and the nature of the disaster that the society in question 
has to cope with. Refugees have faced a very large disaster and do not 
constitute an ordered society. Relief is extended to them in the 
initial stages in relief camps; those who are able to fend for 
themselves gradually drift out of the camps, while those who are not 
remain behind and are eventually transported to permanent settlements. 
The availability of this option, combined with the extreme difficulties 
faced by the self-settled in surviving economically, make it unfeasible 
for the latter to care for vulnerable persons in their midst. If the 
funds now spent on settlements would be used to assist the self-
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settled, and if existing restrictions on their integration imposed by 
the host government would be removed, they would probably be able to 
look after destitute members of their communities themselves.13 If not, 
and if no better way can be found to assist the vulnerable, settlements 
might continue to have a role to play in the economie integration of 
refugees - but their goals would have to be quite different from what 
they are now. 
The burden of refugees 
If settlements are not good for refugees, might they not be good for 
the host country, in that they avoid the burden which the self-settled 
impose on the population? The impact of a large influx of refugees on 
the region where they settle was the principal object of the study in 
which the author participated in 1986/87, in the region of Kassala -
also in the Eastern Sudan (Kuhlman, 1990). The impact of refugees turns 
out to be a highly complex matter, very difficult to quantify. The 
region one studies is likely to be subject to many factors causing 
social and economie change, of which the refugee influx is only one. 
Moreover, the effects of a mass influx of refugees differ by economie 
class and - in a plural society such as the Sudan - also by ethnicity. 
However, the results of the study do permit some general conclusions. 
While it cannot be denied that the influx of refugees did 
constitute a burden, its impact was by no means uniformly negative to 
the host population. In the town, they had contributed to an expansion 
of the economy, in demand as well as in the supply of labour. 
Commercial horticulture near Kassala and mechanized agriculture 
throughout the southern part of the Eastern Region have benefited 
enormously from the influx of cheap labour; many among the former 
labourer class of West African origin have not become unemployed as a 
result, but emancipated to better economie positions thanks to the 
general expansion of the economy. Since 1978 the Sudan has been in an 
economie crisis, which has caused declining real incomes for most; but 
this decline does not appear to be any worse in Kassala than in less 
refugee-affected areas such as the Central Region. 
The only sector which was clearly negatively affected by the influx 
of refugees is that of small-scale rainfed agriculture, where their 
numbers severely tax the limited natural resources and where ecological 
degradation due to population pressure is clearly in evidence. Over-
grazing and, in places, over-cultivation are causing accelerated 
erosion. Water resources are quite possibly insufficiënt to support a 
settled population throughout the year. Deforestation makes the 
firewood supply into an ever greater problem. Ironically, it is in the 
villages of that zone that the least complaints against refugees are 
heard. This is because the refugees who have settled there belong to 
the same ethnic groups as the local Sudanese. Both were nomads until 
the recent past, and the villages in this zone are the result of a 
settlement process which is still continuing. What difference does it 
make whether someone was forced to settle because of the economie 
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decline of nomadism on one side of the border or because of political 
violence on the other? 
To be sure, the absorption capacity of a region may be severely 
taxed by rapid population growth such as occurs with mass influx of 
refugees; and indeed, at the time of the research it was too early to 
assess the full impact of the disastrous drought from which the Kassala 
region was discovering, and which also brought a renewed large flow of 
refugees. But the large and steady flow from 1967 to the early 1980s 
did not result in an overall deterioration of either incomes or 
employment among the host population - except for the small farmers in 
the rainfed sector. 
So much for the refugees' impact on employment and incomes. 
However, we must also consider the effects on other aspects of the 
economy. The water supply in Kassala town is under pressure from 
population growth (caused by natural growth and by rural-urban 
migration as well as by refugee influx); however, water resources are 
adequate and the fact that they are not yet adequately harnessed is due 
to the general economie situation in the Sudan, not to the refugee 
influx. Housing has become more congested since the coming of the 
refugees (there is 19 per cent less space per person than twenty years 
previously), but curiously enough the rents have not increased 
relatively to the general price level: instead, many Sudanese have 
responded to the demand for rented housing by either building houses 
or renting out part of their own house. 
Education and health services do have to cope with increased demand 
due to the refugee influx, but this increase is much less than the 
number of refugees would lead one to suppose: in the case of education 
access of refugees is restricted, and in the cases of both education 
and health there are facilities which have been created specially for 
refugees and which partly compensate for the burden. In 1986, the 
proportion of refugees among the pupils in government primary schools 
in the research area was 12 per cent, while they made up 20.5 per cent 
of the total population in the area; in secondary schools the 
proportion of refugee pupils was 10 per cent. In the health sector, 
there are no statistics which show the number of refugee patients: 
Sudanese and refugees are treated without discrimination, and no 
patiënt is asked to which group he or she belongs. The proportions are 
likely to reflect those among the population as a whole, with the 
understanding that facilities for refugees also cater for both them and 
Sudanese. Thus, the overall burden is less than proportional to the 
number of refugees but a burden is certainly is. However, one may 
legitimately ask why this burden could not be borne by the host 
country: if the refugees contribute to a higher regional income from 
which these services are financed, why could the state not finance the 
necessary expansion in them? The answer is, of course, that social 
services are at present not adequately financed in the Sudan because 
of the economie crisis and the crisis of the state; but for that 
refugees cannot be blamed. It is a fact that the expansion in social 
services over the last twenty years has lagged far behind the increase 
in population. This means that the burden of refugees is expressed in 
deteriorating services rather than in increased government expenditure. 
Self-settled refugees suffer many disadvantages because of their 
lack of legal status: they are subject to travel restrictions; they are 
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liable to be detained by police at any time (a frequent occurrence 
especially in Khartoum); they cannot obtain a business licence from 
local authorities; and because most do not have a work permit, as 
employees they are at the mercy of their employers' whims - which makes 
them into a docile and cheap labour force, undercutting their Sudanese 
colleagues. In view of the positive effects which they have had on 
several sectors of the regional economy, the observer may wonder 
whether with less restrictions on refugees' economie activities those 
positive effects might not have been even larger than they are. Higher 
aggregate regional incomes can also be taxed to provide the necessary 
financing for expanding social services. While special aid to these 
services is necessary to cope with the initial shock of a mass influx, 
in the longer run the need for such aid must disappear - provided the 
refugees are enabled to acquire adequate incomes. 
Thus, the burden of self-settled refugees needs to be qualified: in 
most respects it is far less than one would think from just adding more 
beneficiaries to a fixed amount of resources, and there are significant 
positive effects to compensate for part of it. Moreover, with more 
enlightened policies the positive effects might have been enhanced and 
the burden would have been lighter. Yet, a burden it unquestionably 
remains. But what about the impact of the settlements? Whereas the 
financial costs for setting up and running the settlements is borne by 
foreign donors (mainly UNHCR),1'' the host country provides the land. In 
the Sudan it was thought at first that giving land to refugees would 
be a boon rather than a burden to the country. The country is large and 
thinly populated, with much of its land resources being unused or 
underused. The settlement refugees could help to realize the Sudan's 
potential for agricultural development. In economie terms, the 
opportunity cost of land was regarded as small or even negative. Yet, 
as we saw in the previous section, the government finds it difficult 
to make sufficiënt land available to refugees. 
The degree to which land may be under- or over-utilized is not a 
given quantity, because it depends on the technology applied. Land may 
be thinly populated, yet utilized to the fuil or even over-exploited 
with the technology available to the users. Land which is not 
cultivated at a particular time may yet play an essential role in the 
local production system: it may be used as pasture, as a reserve of 
forest products, or left fallow as part of a shifting cultivation 
system. If part of such land is expropriated for refugee settlement, 
the balance of the existing agrarian system may be upset. The local 
population will either resist such encroachment or, seeing that with 
investment the potential of the land is raised, attempt to benefit from 
the increase in value themselves. 
Of the former case we saw the results in the previous section; the 
latter is exemplified by the scheme at Qalaa en-Nahal. The area is 
fertile, but it suffers from two problems: there is no permanent water, 
and the soil is too heavy to cultivate efficiently without the aid of 
tractors. Hence, it was little used and considered a suitable area for 
refugee settlement - with the appropriate investments in tractors and 
water supply. Once these were available, however, Sudanese nationals 
also became interested in the land and by 1980 a survey of the agency 
EuroAction-ACORD found that 45 per cent of the area under crops was 
cultivated by Sudanese farmers (Betts, 1982: 91). The Sudanese 
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governraent had clearly been too optimistic in its estimates of the 
amounts of land that could actually be issued to refugees. 
Obviously, if it is so difficult to make land available to 
refugees, the cost of organized settlements to the host country must 
be substantial. The initial optimism was probably due to the f act that 
the government simply appropriated land from the rural population.15 
It could afford to believe that the opportunity cost of the land was 
low because it let others pay that cost. The cost of wage-earning and 
peri-urban organized settlements is lower, of course, as land needs to 
be provided only for residential purposes; in rural wage-earning 
organized settlements, however, self-sufficiency is even more difficult 
to achieve than in the land settlements. Only the peri-urban 
settlements might be considered justifiable, in the sense that the cost 
to the host country is relatively low and the potential for self-
sufficiency reasonable - which is not to say that they are, on balance, 
preferable to spontaneous organized settlement in urban areas. 
In fact, wage-earning settlements entail a different and seldom 
noticed cost to the host country. The food aid given to those 
settlements without family self-sufficiency serves in effect to 
subsidize the Sudanese commercial farmers: they enable refugees to work 
for wages below those on which Sudanese workers could subsist. In this 
way, they undercut not only wage opportunities but also wage levels and 
working conditions for the Sudanese. 
Conclusions 
On the basis of the limited evidence presented in this article, it is 
not possible to make a definitive conclusion as to which of the two 
major alternatives for the settlement of refugees in Africa performs 
better in terms of economie integration as 1 have defined it - much 
less to state which is preferable, all things considered. For that the 
data at our disposal are too crude and too few. Nevertheless, the 
evidence strongly suggests that (1) the massive external intervention 
necessitated by the policy of organized settlement has - at least in 
the case of Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees in the Sudan - failed to 
make the refugees self-sufficiënt or even to make them better off than 
the self-settled; and (2) that it is not as effective in lessening the 
economie burden of refugees on the host country as had been thought -
partly because the burden of the self-settled is not an unmitigated 
one, and partly because the cost of organized settlements is 
substantial not only to the international community but to the host 
country as well. 
The experience in other cases of refugees in Africa may be 
different, of course. This is difficult to evaluate, as there is a lack 
of empirical data on self-settled refugees and on the impact of both 
the self-settled and those in settlements on the host country. The 
reported success of Tanzania's settlements must be due to a large 
extent to the generosity with which land was made available (either 
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because there really was plenty of unused land or because the 
government was able to overcome resistance among the local population); 
this generosity has been expressed also in that the Tanzanian 
government treated refugees equally with nationals, even in that the 
latter were also subject to enforced resettlement under the Ujamaa 
ideology (Rogge, 1981: 206-209). Tanzania has even granted 
naturalization to refugees, something rarely done elsewhere in Africa. 
The common reluctance of refugees to be resettled, while due to several 
reasons, is at least in part a reflection on unattractive economie 
conditions in the organized settlements. 
This is not to say that the self-settled tend to be well integrated 
economically. On the contrary, their Standard of living is commonly 
lower than that of even the more disadvantaged groups of nationals. Nor 
is the burden they impose on the host population to be minimized. What 
I do suggest is that policies could be designed to enhance economie 
integration among the self-settled which would stand a much better 
chance of success than the prevalent policy of favouring organized 
organized settlement. Whereas even under present conditions economie 
integration among the self-settled appears to be better than in the 
organized settlements, appropriate policies could do much to improve 
it - both with regard to the economie situation of the refugees 
themselves and with regard to the burden they impose on the host 
country. At present, this integration is hampered by the restrictions 
imposed on refugees by host country governments, and aid agencies 
appear to be less willing to share the burden where the self-settled 
are concerned. If those institutional constraints could be overcome, 
and if host country governments could face their responsibilites more 
squarely, both the refugees and the host populations would be better 
off. 
On the part of the host country, such policies could include the 
lifting of restrictions on the participation of the refugees in the 
national economy. First and foremost, this would mean the legalization 
of the status of the self-settled, and therewith the removal of any 
threat to relocate them forcibly to settlements. Such a simple stroke 
of the pen would - in the Sudan - automatically mean that refugees 
would be entitled to a work permit. Other important restrictions are 
those on travel within the country and on conducting business 
activities. Removing them would enable the host country to utilize the 
human potential of the refugees to the full. This does not necessarily 
mean that no there would be no restrictions applying to refugees at 
all. In the Sudan, for instance, the Regulation of Asylum Act (1974) 
states that the Minister will determine where the refugees may reside. 
The policy of organized settlement is based on this clause, but it 
could also be interpreted as signifying that the Minister may denote 
certain regions for refugee settlement. Even while refugees may travel 
freely, their work permit will state where they live and they may be 
required to justify a sojoum in a different area. 
The international community would have to commit its financial 
support to programmes designed for assisting self-settled refugees and 
for helping the host country to cope with the burden they impose. This 
would require the removal of present institutional barriers which 
prevent agencies concerned with aid to refugees from contributing to 
programmes for both refugees and host population, and agencies 
concerned with development aid from helping refugees. Research has an 
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important role to play in identifying those socio-economic groups that 
are most in need of assistance, and in outlining the ways in which 
assistance could most effectively be used. In the Kassala research it 
was found that such target groups would at the same time include the 
majority of the refugees and those among the nationals that were most 
severly affected by the refugee burden. Such assistance programmes 
would be concerned with income-generating activities. Outside this 
domain, there are other specific forms of assistance to refugee-
affected areas which will be useful: to social services and 
infrastructure, in order to compensate for the initial adjustment to 
a large increase of population; and assistance in the fields of soil 
and water conservation and ref orestation, to cope with the 
environmental impact of refugees, which is one of the most notable 
aspects of the refugee burden in Eastern Sudan. 
Of course, as pointed out in the introduction, economie integration 
is only one consideration in refugee policy. It is important in that 
it is often used as justification for a policy and, as I have argued, 
wrongly so. While it may be impossible to sustain such justification, 
there may still be compelling reasons for not adopting a policy 
appropriate to economie integration. These reasons have to do with the 
institutional interests of those who make those policies. While this 
is perhaps only to be expected, it leads often to a misperception of 
the refugee condition, and to a failure of those policies to achieve 
their stated objectives. Refugees are seen not only as people in need, 
but as people in need of those things which aid organizations want to 
provide: certain goods and certain kinds of know-how. Host governments 
only define persons who have fled from a neighbouring country as 
refugees when they want to settle them in camps and have them provided 
with those things which donors are eager to provide. This can be 
because the country of asylum wishes to embarrass the country of origin 
by publicizing its domestic problems; because it is feared that the 
refugees might upset the local balance of power and should therefore 
be isolated in a remote area;16 or because it is faced with a crisis 
such as mass flight, which it cannot handle without external support. 
In a sense, people become refugees because the host government sees 
fit to capture them under the aid umbrella.17 
Notes 
1. An example: in 1986, only a few thousand Ethiopian refugees were able to leave the Sudan 
for resettlement, out of a total of over 650,000 (Neuwirth, 1988: 31). 
2. A somewhat different terminology is used by Rogge (1987: 87): self-support means 
independence from food handouts, self-reliance means producing almost all daily needs, 
self-sufficiency is complete independence from any external help. The latter two are 
equivalent to my family and community self-sufficiency, respectively. 
3. Not, it may be remarked, the problems that caused flight. Some authors (e.g. Zolberg es., 
1989: 263-268; Bulcha, 1988: 235; Wijbrandi, 1986: 128) rightly stress that a true solution to 
the problems of refugees can only be achieved by addressing the 'root causes' of flight. 
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However, this article is concerned with the question of what can be done in the absence of 
such a fundamental solution, by those who have little power to address the root cause - such 
as host governments and UNHCR (cf. Aga Khan es., 1986: 57; Stein, 1986: 267). 
4. The distinctions between integration, assimilation, marginalization and segregation have been 
cast into a model by the psychologist John W. Berry (e.g., 1988: 45). All four may be 
considered as modes of acculturation, in which process there are two basic dimensions: the 
degree of contact between migrants and natives, and the extent to which the former 
maintain their own cultural identity. No contact and maintaining one's own identity means 
segregation or separation, whereas intensive contact and loss of identity results in 
assimilation. It may also happen that the group withdraws into itself, yet its culture is 
destroyed - this is what Berry calls marginalization, and examples are provided by many 
American Indian groups and by the Australian aboriginals. Finally, a combination of 
intensive contact with the dominant society while also maintaining one's own culture is 
termed integration. I disagree with Berry in that I think his two dimensions are not logically 
independent from one another: maintaining one's own cultural identity has to go together 
with intensive social relations within one's cultural group, and this means less contacts 
outside. Yet, as a midway compromise between full segregation and total loss of cultural 
identity his concept is elucidating, and highly suited to a plural society. 
5. A plural society is defined as one in which co-exist not only various ethnic groups, but 
whére each group occupies its own niche in the economy. As economie role tends to be 
strongly correlated with power, income and status, this means that social stratification has 
a strong ethnic bias. This does not necessarily mean that socio-economic position is totally 
determined by ethnicity: it is sufficiënt that the two are correlated. The term orginates with 
J.S. Furnivall in a work on colonial Indonesia (1939). 
6. Each culture has its own criteria of what constitutes an acceptable minimum Standard of 
living. This is the only valid approach to a 'poverty line': general criteria such as proposed 
in Dudley Seers' famous definition of development (Seers, 1969) cannot be universally 
applied, much less specified. The minimum requirements for physiological survival (another 
possible approach) are far below what human beings consider a life worth living; and 
moreover, in many if not all cultures some values are placed even above the biological 
survival of the individual - as even the most doctrinaire neo-classical economist must admit. 
On this issue, see the discussion in Sen, 1981: 12-18. 
7. This meaning of the word 'economie' combines elements of Lionel Robbins' famous 
definition of economics (1932) and Polanyi's 'substantive' definition (1958). 
8. There are a few exceptions, notably the case of the refugees from Portuguese Guinea who 
fled to Senegal during the war of independence in the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
Senegalese government took no measures to settle them in camps, but encouraged them to 
settle among the local population (Rogge, 1981: 200). There are other cases where people 
fled their country because of oppression but were never recognized as refugees, because the 
host country government did not find it politically opportune to advertise the existence of 
a problem or to invite foreign involvement in its relations with a neighbouring state (cf. 
Zolberg et al., 1989: 37, 58). 
9. Most of the the arguments that follow are listed in Wijbrandi, 1986 (pp. 11-12). However, 
my treatment of them is quite different from his. 
10. However, it would be wrong to suppose that most refugees are revolutionaries bent on 
overthrowing the regime in their home country, while the host government is filled with the 
most peaceful intentions towards its neighbour. In the case of Eritrean refugees in the 
Sudan, the majority are not engaged in any political activity against Ethiopia; the Sudanese 
government, on the other hand, actively supports the Eritrean guerrillas - as Ethiopia does 
for the Southern Sudanese rebels. 
11. It must, however, be pointed out that the sample of refugees in Doka was drawn from one 
particular group of Ethiopian refugees, namely those who could be easily identified. This 
means a certain ethnic bias, as those refugees who belong to the Beni Amer tribe (found 
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on both sides of the border) were left outside the sample. As the latter integrate more 
easily, the sample probably erred in ascribing too low average incomes to the self-settled. 
12. Wage labour is also a factor in the incomes of refugees in land settlements. 
13. It must be admitted that this does not necessarily mean that the vulnerable will be cared 
for adequately. However, inadequacies will be such as occur commonly in poor countries 
and cannot be ascribed to refugee status. 
14. Some help is also given to compensate for the burden of self-settled refugees. In the case 
of Kassala, UNHCR provides some «assistance to the departments of health and education 
in the region, and special projects have been designed after the Second International 
Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) in 1984: extension of electricity 
and water, and a credit scheme for the rural areas. 
15. In the Sudan, land which has not been specifically recognized as freehold is by law the 
property of the state. This means virtually all land, with the exception of some large estates 
belonging to a few rich families. 
16. This was clearly a consideration in moving the first wave of Eritrean refugees to Qalaa en-
Nahal (Karadawi, 1983). 
17. This is a central theme in Barbara Harrell-Bond's Imposing aid (1986). 
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